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INTRODUCTION 
Martin E. Connor* 
Contributions of huge amounts of money by wealthy individuals 
and corporations to American political campaigns have a long and 
sordid history.  For example, in 1860, New York Democrats put 
together a Fusion slate so voters could vote against Lincoln without 
dividing their votes among the three Democratic opponents.1  New 
York merchants contributed substantial funds.2  Reports stated that 
William Astor had given $1 million to the campaign.3  This was 
$27,780,000 in 2013 dollars, at a time when there was no radio or 
television on which to spend it.4  The campaign was for New York 
State presidential electors only.5 
In 1896, Mark Hanna was widely reported to have raised and 
contributed $3.5 million to elect William McKinley to the Presidency.6  
This was equivalent to $94,605,000 in current day dollars.7  That 
amount was solely for the national effort.8  State party committees at 
the time bore the major burden of raising and spending for the 
Presidential campaign.9  Where did the money come from?  All banks 
and large corporations were assessed a percentage of their profits.10  
 
* B.A. (Politics) 1968, J.D. 1970, The Catholic University of America.  Election 
attorney since 1972.  NYS Senator, 1978–2008 (Minority Leader, 1995–2002). 
 1. See WALTER STAHR, SEWARD, LINCOLN’S INDISPENSABLE MAN 207 (Simon & 
Schuster, 2012). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See Inflation Calculator, DAVEMANUAL.COM, http://www.davemanuel.com/ 
inflation-calculator.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2013). 
 5. See STAHR, supra note 1, at 207. 
 6. See WILLIAM T. HORNER, OHIO’S KINGMAKER: MARK HANNA, MAN AND 
MYTH 193 (Ohio Univ. Press 2010). 
 7. See Inflation Calculator, supra note 4. 
 8. See HORNER, supra note 6, at 193. 
 9. See id. at 201–12. 
 10. See id. at 195. 
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How and where was it spent?  With no TV or radio, one can only 
imagine the payoffs that were made. 
In the 1960 presidential election, it was an open secret that Joseph 
P. Kennedy spent millions of dollars to make his son the President.11  
The exact amount is uncertain since no disclosure was required.  
There are many stories of the bundles of hundred dollar bills used in 
the 1960 campaigns.12  Both contributions and expenditures were 
commonly made in cash.13 
The lack of disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures 
in the first 160 years or so of our Republic does not mean there was 
no recognition of the potential for corruption.  Indeed, succeeding to 
the Presidency upon the death of McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt led 
the successful charge to pass a ban on corporations contributing to 
federal campaigns.14 
However, the realization that money was corrupting elections went 
back further than the early twentieth century.  The earliest casebook 
on American election law of which I am aware is A Collection of 
Leading Cases on the Law of Elections in the United States.15  In its 
766 pages, there is but one mention of campaign contributions.16  It 
arose in the context of a suit for a debt for rent.17  In 1840, the plaintiff 
had erected a log cabin on Broadway in New York City at the request 
of the defendant.18  The log cabin was intended for public and other 
meetings of the Whig Party and for the sale of refreshments.19 
 
 11. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE PASSAGE OF POWER: THE YEARS OF LYNDON 
JOHNSON 84–85 (2012). 
 12. See id. at 72. 
 13. See id. at 293. 
 14. See American President: Biography of Theodore Roosevelt, MILLER CTR., 
http://www.millercenter.org/president/roosevelt/essays/biography/print (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2013). 
 15. FREDERICK CHARLES BRIGHTLY, A COLLECTION OF LEADING CASES ON THE 
LAW OF ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1871). 
 16. Id. at 612–15. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See Jackson v. Walker, 5 Hill 27, 27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843), aff’d, 7 Hill 387 
(N.Y. 1844).  The 1844 affirmance was by an 11-11 split in the Court for the 
Correction of Errors, New York’s highest court made up of the Chancellor and all 
the State Senators. See About the Court, APP. DIVISION SECOND JUDICIAL DEP’T, 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/ad2/aboutthecourt.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 
2013). 
 19. See Jackson, 5 Hill 27. 
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In August of 1840, the plaintiff announced that he would be taking 
down the log cabin because he was losing money.20  It cost the 
plaintiff $1,600 or $1,800 to build the cabin.21  A subscription was 
opened and $200 was raised.22  The defendant told the plaintiff that he 
wanted the cabin to be kept open until after the election and that he 
“would not permit the whig flag across Broadway to be struck.”23  He 
promised to raise the balance of $1,000 or pay it out of his own 
pocket.24  The plaintiff kept the log cabin open until after the 
election.25  The plaintiff sued the defendant in New York City 
Superior Court for the promised amount.26  The defendant alleged 
that the contribution of $1,000 for a campaign headquarters was 
illegal and thus his promise of payment for such was unenforceable.27  
After the trial judge denied the defendant’s motion to find the 
contract illegal, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff.28  On appeal to 
the Supreme Court of New York, the judgment was reversed on the 
grounds that a contribution for a campaign headquarters was illegal 
under an 1829 statute.29 
In an effort to ensure the “purity of elections,” the New York 
Legislature had enacted a statute making it unlawful (a 
misdemeanor) for any candidate or any other person to pay for, or 
contribute any money for any “purpose intended to promote an 
election of any particular person or ticket, except for defraying the 
expenses of printing, and the circulation of votes, handbills and other 
papers, previous to any election.”30  Interestingly enough, this statute 
more or less banned campaign expenditures toward any sort of “get 
out the vote” operations.  Since the purpose of keeping the log cabin 
open was clearly to promote the election of “Gen. Harrison” for 
 
 20. See id. at 28. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. at 28, 31–32. 
 28. See id. at 28. 
 29. See id. at 31–32. 
 30. Act of May 5, 1829, ch. 373, § 1(5), 1829 N.Y. Laws 565–66.  Political parties, 
or factions, printed the actual ballot marked for their candidates and the voters took 
them into polling places and deposited them into the ballot boxes. 
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President and the Whig ticket in general, the expenditure was illegal 
and the promised payment was unenforceable.31 
The court rejected the contention that the statute was intended 
only to forbid the contribution of money for corrupt purposes.32  The 
court stated that “[t]he legislature evidently thought that the most 
effectual way ‘to preserve the purity of election,’ was to keep them 
free from the contaminating influence of money.”33  It should be 
noted that the court also commented that “[t]here can be little doubt 
that large sums of money are expended upon elections for other 
purposes; but the statute says, ‘it shall not be lawful’ to do so, and the 
enactment should either be enforced or repealed.”34 
While the statute in question seems shocking to us in its lack of 
concern for free speech, it must be remembered that the Fourteenth 
Amendment had not yet been passed35 and that the First Amendment 
then applied only to the federal government.36  Obviously, New York 
State’s constitutional guarantee of free speech37 was not seen to cover 
campaign contributions and expenditures. 
Modern day reformers are prone to advance proposals to define 
exactly what constitutes the legitimate use of campaign funds, and 
many states have already done so.  Aside from concerns about 
candidates’ use of contribution funds for expenditures that are clearly 
personal, some laws on expenditures obviously impede legitimate 
political strategies employed by candidates.  Local conditions can 
make gestures like sending flowers, perhaps to important constituents 
who are hospitalized or to the funerals of those that have passed 
away, a wise and necessary political expenditure—and one a 
candidate should be no more expected to pay from her personal funds 
than a businessman who makes such gestures to purely business 
acquaintances. 
Does anyone who has ever examined the 1960 presidential 
campaign doubt that John F. Kennedy chose wisely when he engaged 
his brother Robert as his campaign manager?  Of course, no one 
knows how the manager’s expenses were paid since that was in the 
 
 31. See generally Jackson, 5 Hill at 31. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Even after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment was 
not applied to New York until 1925. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 36. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
 37. N.Y. CONST. OF 1821, art.VII, § 8. 
CONNOR_CHRISTENSEN2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2013  3:28 PM 
2012] INTRODUCTION 591 
“cash and carry” era.  In my opinion, campaign finance restrictions 
against employing relatives are overreaching.  A relative just might be 
the best person for the job.  However, that does not mean funneling 
campaign funds to a relative for “no-show” employment should be 
tolerated. 
In my first foray into politics, following my graduation from law 
school and move to New York, I joined a local “Reform” Democratic 
club in 1971.  The club had no relationship to the official Democratic 
Party organization; indeed, it usually opposed the regular party’s 
candidates.  The major issue for the club’s members was opposition to 
the Vietnam War.  Dues were $5.00 per year ($7.00 a couple).  The 
annual fundraiser that year was $10.00 per person.  At club meetings, 
we passed around a hat to raise money for planned activities. 
In 1972, the club’s major mission was to support George McGovern 
for President and to oppose our incumbent Representative who 
supported the war effort.  The geographic area where the club 
worked consisted of eighteen election districts—about thirty-two city 
blocks.  Club members knocked on doors and handed out literature 
the club printed urging support for the candidates.  I spent about $140 
on canvas cards—index cards containing the names and addresses of 
each voter.  The late David Levine, a local caricaturist of note, 
donated a limited edition of a caricature print he did of McGovern for 
us.  We sold about fifty of them for a twenty-five dollar contribution 
to our local McGovern “committee.” 
The only “official” contact we had with the McGovern campaign 
occurred weekly when one member would go to the NYC McGovern 
headquarters and get as many “Vote for McGovern” lapel buttons as 
he could talk out of them.  On Saturdays at the main street corner in 
the neighborhood, we set up a table, handed out the literature we had 
printed and sold the buttons for a quarter a piece.  A few affluent 
types would put a dollar in the can.  One Saturday, our “button haul” 
was $275.  All the money we raised went to printing more literature 
and two mailings (one before the primary and one before the General 
Election).  For the mailings, we sat around tables and hand-addressed 
a piece to each voter. 
We kept no record of who threw money into the effort.  Everyone 
was a volunteer; no one stole any of the money.  We helped elect our 
McGovern delegates to the National Convention and paid for some 
of them to go to Miami.  While McGovern was badly beaten in most 
places in the country in the general election, he won our little 
neighborhood by a thirteen to one margin. 
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No one in our grassroots effort was seeking any favor from a 
President McGovern.  No one important in his campaign knew any of 
us.  We probably raised and spent about $4,500 (about $24,700 in 
2013 dollars).  We did not have to file any forms then or make any 
disclosures.  Today, we would be in big trouble unless we had a 
lawyer and kept track of those quarters, filed reports, placed a fair 
market value on those prints, and kept detailed records.  In order to 
prevent corruption, a totally voluntary grassroots effort like I have 
described is no longer possible. 
Two major devices embraced by the post-Watergate reforms in 
federal and state laws are disclosure and limits on contributions.38  In 
more recent years, disclosure requirements have been expanded to 
include identification of a contributor’s employer.39  The rationale for 
this requirement is that the public has a right to know the economic 
interests who are supporting the candidate.40 
While one can reasonably conclude that contributors who are 
CEOs or top management of a business are supporting a candidate 
because they believe she has been, or will be, sympathetic to their 
business’s economic interest, the same cannot necessarily be said 
about the motivations of every employee who makes a contribution.  
It may be that lower level employees have contributed to the 
candidate’s campaign because they agree with the candidate on other 
issues more important to them than whether the company they work 
for gets a particular tax break.  Perhaps they are avid sportsmen, 
committed feminists, a second cousin or former classmate of the 
candidate, committed political party members, neighbors of the 
candidate concerned foremost about a community issue, or someone 
who identifies ethnically with the candidate.  The list of possible 
reasons for someone making a contribution is diverse and could go on 
forever. 
Disclosing the employers of contributors who happen to work for a 
very large company employing thousands invariably causes the press 
to write stories such “XYZ Corporation Contributes Big Bucks to 
Candidate.”  Unfortunately, that is the information that will reach 
most voters even though it is merely an inference that may not be 
justified by the actual facts. 
 
 38. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976); see also Richard Briffault, 
Citizens United: Democracy Realized—or Defeated?, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1682 
(2012). 
 39. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 431(13) (2012). 
 40. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 3. 
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I believe that contributing to a political campaign within legally 
mandated limits is part of a citizen’s First Amendment rights.  The 
more people who see making a contribution as part of their 
participation in the political process, the better off our democracy will 
be.  I have always been wary of anything that I viewed as discouraging 
persons from participating in the public forum, including by making a 
financial commitment to a campaign. 
Some years ago on the New York State Senate floor I expressed 
my concern with a colleague’s proposed “campaign finance reform” 
bill, which I supported, because it would have required disclosure of 
employment information (the bill had no chance of passing in that 
body then, or possibly now!).  My concern was, and is, the possible 
retaliation by the employer should a person contribute to a campaign 
for a candidate the employer opposes. 
Perhaps the most expansive protection of employees in the country 
is found in the New York City Human Rights Law.  It forbids 
discrimination in employment (refusal to hire or discharge) “because 
of the actual or perceived age, race, creed, color, national origin, 
gender, disability, marital status, partnership status, sexual 
orientation or alienage or citizenship status of any person”41 as well as 
because of “actual or perceived status of said individual as a victim of 
domestic violence, or as a victim of sex offenses or stalking.”42  While 
federal and New York State election laws guard against the 
nineteenth century practice of employers marching their employees 
off to vote in lockstep, nothing I am aware of prevents an employer 
from discharging an employee because they do not like the 
contributions she has made to candidates. 
Perhaps requiring too much regulation and/or disclosure prevents 
true grassroots political activity and deters ordinary citizens from 
contributing to campaigns. This consideration has not often been 
given a fair hearing in the rush for reform. 
In The Public’s Right to Know Versus Compelled Speech, Dick 
Carpenter and Jeff Milyo have presented much food for thought 
concerning the advisability of requiring disclosure of contributors in 
non-candidate elections.43  Is the danger of corruption really present 
 
 41. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(1)(a) (2012). 
 42. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107.1(2). 
 43. Dick Carpenter & Jeffrey Milyo, The Public’s Right to Know Versus 
Compelled Speech: What Does Social Science Research Tell Us About the Benefits 
and Costs of Campaign Finance Disclosure in Non-Candidate Elections?, 40 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603 (2012). 
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in such elections?  Or, is the concern that the public ought to know 
who is trying to influence their opinions?  If the latter policy is the 
reason, does it ignore the fact that the arguments advanced, no matter 
the source, ought to be the persuasive determinant with the voters?  
The authors’ survey of social science research certainly calls into 
question the rationale for mandating disclosure in non-candidate 
elections. 
There seems to be a grave concern about anonymous messages in 
campaigns.  I have always viscerally felt them unfair.  But upon 
reflection, it occurs to me that the 100,000 colonists who bought and 
read Common Sense did not know, nor did they need to know, that 
its author was Thomas Paine.  Of course, there was a far better reason 
then for anonymity because the author’s life and liberty were at risk.  
Certainly, the voters persuaded by The Federalist to vote for 
ratification of the Constitution were not apprised of the identity of 
Publius or who paid to have the articles published.  Only a very few 
insiders knew the true authors were Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 
when the votes were cast.  The cogency of the arguments carried the 
day. 
Thwarting participation in issues elections by grassroots action of 
citizens should be avoided at all costs.  Expenditure limits that trigger 
disclosure and filing requirements, require legal advice, and threaten 
severe penalties for violations should be at high enough amounts to 
permit a robust participation by ordinary citizens in grassroots 
organizations. 
The real dilemma is the fear that big money and the limited 
attention span of voters—resulting in their responding to slick and 
simplistic two-minute advertisements—will carry the day, regardless 
of the inherent merits of the pro and con arguments.  If that is so, 
then our democracy is truly not functioning as intended.  Perhaps the 
answer lies in education rather than substituting another shorthand, 
notwithstanding the merits of the argument, factor: “who’s paying for 
it?” 
Amy Loprest and Bethany Perskie’s article Empowering Small 
Donors sets forth an explanation of how New York City’s highly 
successful multiple match public finance program has worked to focus 
candidates’ attention on raising funds in relatively small amounts 
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from just “plain folks” in New York City’s neighborhoods.44  They 
also explain the challenges facing the program arising from recent 
Supreme Court decisions. 
In my opinion, the program has generally been a resounding 
success.  The obvious failure of the program with respect to the last 
three mayoral campaigns due to the outlandish campaign spending by 
one of the wealthiest men in the world has caused many to doubt the 
effectiveness of the system.  The authors cite how close Michael 
Bloomberg’s victories were.  But, political campaigns are not 
horseshoes and close doesn’t count.  Democrats Mark Green and Bill 
Thompson losing by “only” 35,000 and 50,000 votes, respectively, to a 
candidate running on the Republican line in a City with 2.5 million 
more Democrats than Republicans shows that Green and Thompson 
were not really competitive in persuading voters with the resources 
the program provided. 
As the authors discuss, the Supreme Court outlawed the “bonus” 
provision that awarded Green and Thompson additional matching 
funds in response to Bloomberg’s astronomical spending.  The New 
York City Campaign Finance Board’s only remaining response to 
someone spending over $100 million in a mayor’s race is to remove 
the cap on expenditures for the financial underdog.  That response is 
of limited comfort, however, since the additional funds must be raised 
at a contribution limit of $4,950 per person before they may be spent.  
There is no use in pretending there is a solution to the problems 
created by an out-sized self-funder.  Buckley v. Valeo45 has precluded 
a real solution and its progeny have only made things worse. 
The big success of the New York City Campaign Finance program 
is the number of small donors that have been brought into play and 
now realize that their small contributions count.  As the authors note, 
the program’s intersection with term limits have produced many 
competitive campaigns and encouraged many more candidates to 
compete.  This big win for democracy is counterbalanced, in my 
opinion, by the fact that an expenditure limit of $168,000 for a City 
Council campaign is insufficient to overcome the inherent advantages 
of incumbency in the absence of scandal or gross incompetence by the 
incumbent. 
 
 44. Amy Loprest & Bethany Perskie, Empowering Small Donors: New York 
City’s Multiple Match Public Financing as a Model for a Post-Citizens United World, 
40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639 (2012). 
 45. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
CONNOR_CHRISTENSEN2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2013  3:28 PM 
596 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XL 
One feature that strikes me about the New York City Campaign 
Finance program is the fact that the spending limit for Mayor is 
$6,426,000 and only $4,018,000 for the other two citywide offices 
(Comptroller and Public Advocate).  Is this difference really justified 
by a neutral rationale when candidates for all three offices must 
appeal to the same number of voters?  Of course, Mayor is a more 
powerful and important office.  But, I know of no discounts available 
for radio and television advertisements, postage or printing for the 
two lesser offices.  If there were any, the Campaign Finance Board 
would undoubtedly find them to be in violation of its requirement 
that such costs be at “fair market value.”  Why should a candidate for 
Mayor get to spend $2.41 million dollars more, $1.324 million of it in 
public money? 
In the era of required disclosure of campaign contributors by 
candidates, the widespread exception that has long existed for 
“independent expenditure” campaigns, both in federal and state 
regulatory schemes is starting to come to a close.  A couple of 
decades ago, the rules for whether such an effort was truly 
independent of the candidate’s campaign were rather clear-cut and 
easy to enforce.  For example, the Federal Election Commission rules 
governing such efforts provided, in addition to the obvious instance of 
direct coordination (i.e. the candidate or her campaign requested 
and/or directed the effort), that the use of common consultants, 
lawyers, pollsters were clear indications of coordination and, 
therefore, lack of independence.46  Furthermore, the copying of the 
candidate’s campaign literature by the independent campaign for its 
own use was deemed to be coordination.47 
In my experience, thirty years ago, one of the big obstacles facing 
an independent campaign was designing appealing advertisements 
and literature without having access to photographs and/or video of 
the candidate.  The advent of the internet solved that problem as well 
as obviating the need for the independent campaign conducting its 
own polling.  Any serious political campaign today has a website 
featuring numerous attractive high-definition photos of the candidate 
and video segments.  They are in the public domain and are available 
for downloading by the independent campaign’s advertisement 
crafters without any knowledge or coordination with the candidate’s 
campaign. 
 
 46. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2006); 11 C.F.R. § 109.21 (2012). 
 47. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)–(8) (2006). 
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Even the expense of poll-testing messages and targeting voters 
independently has been lifted from independent expenditure 
campaigns.  A careful scrutiny of the candidate’s website will reveal 
messages and voter targets that her campaign has already tested by 
polling. 
In response to the explosion in the amount of money that has been 
injected into the political landscape at every level in recent years, 
efforts have been taken at every level of government to require 
disclosure of independent expenditures, the identity of contributors, 
and the amounts they contributed.  Certainly, it is generally accepted 
that the public ought to know who are the persons placing such a 
heavy weight on the scales in a political contest. 
Disclosure of contributors to independent campaigns is generally 
justified under the same rationale as candidate disclosure 
requirements—as an anti-corruption measure.48  Of course, this is the 
only rationale the Supreme Court has accepted as justification for 
requiring disclosure.  One can make the opposite argument, however, 
about requiring the disclosure of contributors to an independent 
expenditure effort.  Absent disclosure and adhering to the “no 
coordination” requirement, a candidate may only know that an 
innocuously sounding committee (i.e., “Citizens for Truth” or “Better 
Government for New York”) is spending money on her behalf.  Press 
reports will undoubtedly ferret out the general interests pushing the 
effort (e.g., “unions,” “real estate,” “sportsmen,” etc.).  But, the 
candidate won’t know who is really providing the big bucks for the 
effort.  With disclosure, she will learn to whom she ought to be 
especially responsive in view of the $100,000 he put into the 
independent effort.  How does that fit in with the anti-corruption 
rationale? 
In A National Model Faces New Challenges, Janos Marton 
provides in in-depth overview of legal and practical challenges 
looming for the New York City Public Campaign Finance system.49  
My current representation of parties in some of the matters he 
reviews precludes me from making extensive commentary.Suffice it to 
say that for anyone looking to make sense of the legal challenges and 
political landscape in New York City elections in 2013, the article is a 
 
 48. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 367 (2010) (citing 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66; McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 196–97 
(2003)). 
 49. Janos Marton, A National Model Faces New Challenges: The New York City 
Campaign Finance System and the 2013 Elections, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 673 (2012). 
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must-read.  The author does an admirable job of informing where we 
have been and where we might be headed with respect to campaign 
finance. 
Professor Jocelyn Benson sets forth a number of principles that 
should govern efforts to reform the campaign finance systems at the 
federal and state levels in the aftermath of the wounds inflicted by 
Citizens United in Saving Democracy: A Blueprint for Reform.50  
Surprisingly, the first value she urges is the equality interest.  She 
makes a compelling case, based on the theory of democracy, for a 
system that rejects giving the economic power of big money spenders 
an inordinate influence in our elections.  It is surprising because, 
while I agree with her, the Supreme Court doesn’t.  The Court has 
rejected the “level playing field” rationale for any campaign finance 
regulation.51  The conclusion of the article accounts for her choice. 
Professor Benson discusses the historical background to provide 
the context for continuing efforts to advance reform, notwithstanding 
the obstacles that the Supreme Court has presented.  I appreciate her 
citing Elihu Root as a leading political activist who first proposed 
prohibiting corporate contributions.  Root is one of my favorites: 
Secretary of War, Secretary of State, United States Senator, winner of 
the 1912 Nobel Peace Prize—and the leading New York election 
lawyer of his day!  Root was on the legal team that secured the 
presidency for Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876 and in 1898, he saved 
Theodore Roosevelt from being disqualified in his race for Governor 
due to a very serious residency problem. 
After surveying the prospects for various reforms that have been 
tried throughout the country and discussing several approaches as 
well as the obstacles to some of them presented by Supreme Court 
decisions, Professor Benson offers the obvious solution for bringing 
about real comprehensive reform: amend the Constitution to overrule 
Buckley v. Valeo as the only way to bring about reform embracing 
the equality, information, participation, and anti-corruption interests 
she has compellingly demonstrated must be served by a reformed 
system.  I agree with her conclusion that this is the only way to 
accomplish the needed reforms, and I have long believed this to be so.  
The Bill of Rights, however, has never been touched by an 
 
 50. Jocelyn Benson, Saving Democracy: A Blueprint for Reform in the Post-
Citizens United Era, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 723 (2012). 
 51. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–50. 
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Amendment.  Most Americans see the First Amendment as sacred 
and inviolable.  
In 1972, a fellow Wall Street lawyer associate who lived in my 
neighborhood took me to a “petition binding.”  It all seemed rather 
mundane and I wondered why lawyers were taking such care in 
assembling the designating petitions.  Three days after the petitions 
were filed, the same friend came into my office and said, “Come on, 
we have to go to the Board of Elections and see if any challenges 
were filed against the petitions.”  I didn’t understand what he was 
saying, but I went! 
That year, I ended up “second seating” my friend in court.  It was 
exciting and swift action.  The next year, I took a case for an insurgent 
and succeeded in having the county organization’s candidate for a 
City Council seat removed from the ballot.  I was hooked.  Where 
else could one commence a proceeding, try the case, write a brief, and 
argue in the Appellate Division and then in New York’s highest 
court, the Court of Appeals, all in a six or seven week span?  About 
four years into doing these election law cases I asked an older 
election lawyer whether he thought anyone would ever pay a lawyer 
to do them.  His definitive answer was: “No way.” 
The bible for New York election lawyers in those days was the two 
volume Gassman’s treatise.52  In its 975 pages and hundreds of cases 
cited, there is not a single mention of campaign finance or 
contributions.  Including its final Cumulative Supplement (1985-1986) 
by D. Alan Wrigley, Jr., only two cases mention campaign finance 
and they deal only with the use of party funds in a primary.53 
In 1989, a new monograph on New York election law was 
published.54  In its 344 pages, only two of them deal with campaign 
finance law and then only to reprint a few sections of the New York 
Statute adopted in 1974.55  Of course, by that time there were a 
number of works on federal campaign finance law.  Now that election 
law has emerged in the last fifteen years as a “subject” in law school, 
new casebooks have been published and they have substantial space 
 
 52. See generally 1–2 BENJAMIN GASSMAN, ELECTION LAW DECISIONS AND 
PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1962). 
 53. See id. at §§ 9, 19. 
 54. See generally EDWARD I. BYER, ELECTION LAW DECISIONS AND PROCEDURE 
(1989). 
 55. See id. at 324–25. 
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dedicated to campaign finance law.56  The latest monograph on New 
York election law has a section on campaign finance as well.57 
For the thirty-one years I served in the State Senate, my law 
practice consisted almost exclusively of election law for the simple 
reason that the “season” for ballot access cases, post-election 
recounts, and court challenges neatly corresponded to the Senate 
being in recess.  About half the work I did was pro bono for political 
allies or colleagues.  In 2001, when the New York City Campaign 
Finance Board ruled that people like me could no longer volunteer 
our professional services for friends and allies, I was delighted.  The 
rules now required even my closest friends running for City office to 
pay market rate! 
Election law is no longer such a seasonal law practice.  The major 
reason is the extensive body of campaign finance law and rules, 
particularly the federal law and the rules of the New York City 
Campaign Finance Board.  Virtually every serious candidate or 
incumbent wants to be sure their campaigns are in compliance to 
avoid penalties, fines, and, even more important for them, to escape 
damaging publicity and prevent opponents from having negative 
ammunition for campaign use.  The lawyers they retain naturally 
want to give them solid legal advice. 
Allen Dickerson and Zac Morgan in Campaign Finance Advisory 
Opinions at the State Level present the case for why election officials 
in the states ought to have clearly defined authority to issue advisory 
opinions on campaign finance questions about which candidates 
(and/or their lawyers) may have questions.58  These questions arise 
quite frequently in campaigns and the legal and political stakes are 
high. 
The authors have surveyed the laws in every state and have noted 
the practice for each state with respect to whether it has a single 
enforcement authority, an agency authorized to issue advisory 
opinions, and whether such opinions provide a “safe harbor” for the 
recipient.  Every campaign finance regulatory system ought to have as 
 
 56. See generally DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN & DANIEL P. 
TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 2012); SAMUEL 
ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF 
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (3d ed. 2007). 
 57. See JERRY H. GOLDFEDER, GOLDFEDER’S MODERN ELECTION LAW chs. 8 & 9 
(3d ed. 2012). 
 58. Allen Dickerson & Zac Morgan, Campaign Finance Advisory Opinions at the 
State Level, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773 (2012). 
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its principle goal widespread compliance.  The best way to accomplish 
this is with an agency that assists candidates in complying with the 
law. 
Frankly, it has always amazed me that legislators enact laws 
governing campaign finance or other campaign activities and do not 
provide for binding advisory opinions with a safe harbor provision.  
After all, whether any of their constituents ever become a candidate 
is unknown; yet, it is virtually certain that most all legislators will be 
candidates again.  More than once I have had clients who are elected 
officials consult me about a problem where they may be penalized 
because of a statute they insist is unclear or unfair.  Sometimes I can’t 
resist saying, “You voted for this.” 
